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ABSTRACT 
The paper analyses the impact of the economic crisis on Greek civil 
society. It explores currents trends in the non-profit sector as well as the 
proliferation of new alternative networks. Academic research has 
documented that civil society’s density has increased and its autonomy 
vis-à-vis the state has strengthened. These trends have led to an 
emerging academic consensus on the revitalisation of Greek civil society 
following the onset of the crisis. However, this revitalisation has taken 
place during a period of severe economic crisis with devastating social 
effects. The paper argues that the density of civil society may be a 
misleading indicator of its strength if abstracted from the broader 
political and economic context. Thus the rapid deterioration of the 
quality of citizenship during the crisis has seriously undermined the 
strength of civil society, despite the significant rise in associationism.  
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‘Social Need’ or ‘Choice’?  
Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper analyses the impact of the economic crisis on Greek civil 
society and links the findings to the broader academic debate on civil 
society. First, the paper explores current trends in the Greek non-profit 
sector. Next, it analyses the proliferation of new informal networks that 
link grassroots social welfare projects to political activism. The paper 
then proceeds to a critical evaluation of the emerging academic 
consensus on the revitalisation of Greek civil society following the onset 
of the crisis. Research has indeed shown that the density of civil society 
has increased and its autonomy vis-à-vis the state has strengthened. This 
revitalisation, however, has taken place during a period of severe 
economic crisis with devastating social effects. Thus, resurgent 
associational life has been coupled with a significant rise in the levels of 
poverty and social marginalisation. On the basis of the Greek case, the 
paper argues that the density of civil society may be a misleading 
indicator of its strength if abstracted from the broader political and 
economic context. Thus, the rapid deterioration of the quality of 
citizenship during the crisis has seriously undermined the strength of 
civil society, despite the significant rise in associationism.  
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, the literature on civil 
society is briefly discussed and varying interpretations of civil society’s 
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strengths are outlined. Then, the impact of the economic crisis on 
European civil societies is presented. A brief account of the social 
consequences of the economic crisis in Greek society follows. Next, 
current trends in the NGO community as well as the rise of new informal 
solidarity networks are analysed. Finally, the challenges that the Greek 
case poses to current interpretations of civil society’s strength are 
summarised. 
The following analysis is based mainly on secondary sources, as well as 
on original data derived from six semi-structured interviews with general 
managers and executive staff of NGOs, including a member of Free 
Social Center Votanikos Kipos and a research associate of the Labour 
Institute of the Greek General Confederation of Labour (INE/GSEE-
ADEDY). Data were also collected by attending two workshops organised 
by solidarity networks and two festivals organised by collectivities 
engaged in diverse economies and prefigurative activism.1 
Supplementary data have also been derived on line, through individual 
                                                 
1
 Interviews: Papageorgiou, L. (President of the Pan-Hellenic Philanthropic Association BREAD & 
ACTION). Personal Interview, 20 February 2014, Athens. Thanou E. (former General Director at 
Doctors of the World (Médecins du Monde)-Greece). Personal Interview, 17 February 2014, Athens.  
Tzanetos, A. (Chairman of the non-profit organisation Praksis). Personal interview, 10 February 2014, 
Athens. Pantazidou M. (Lead Adviser Organisational Learning and Accountability, International 
Amnesty). Personal Interview, 19 December 2013, London. K.K., (member of free social center 
Botanical Garden). Personal Interview. 10 October 2015, Athens. Syriopoulos P. (Research Associate 
of INE – GSEE).  Personal Interview, 12 February 2014, Athens. Workshops: “Institutions of solidarity: 
How are we going to stop society’s impoverishment during the crisis?”, 03 August 2013, 20th Camping 
Anti-Nazi zone – Youth against Racism in Europe (YRE), Thasos (26 July - 4 August 2013). “Institutions 
and networks of applied social solidarity”, 30 June 2013, 17
th
 Anti-racist Festival of Social Solidarity, 
Athens (28-30 June 2013). Festivals: ‘Common Fest 2015 – Φεστιβάλ για τα Κοινά’ (15-17 May 2015), 
Athens. Degrowth Forum “Prosperity without growth”, organised by Research & Degrowth Greece 
and Iliosporoi, 20-22 February 2015, Athens. 
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NGOs’ websites and online platforms2, as well as press monitoring 
during the period of 2013-2015.  
2. Perspectives on Civil Society 
 
Numerous definitions of civil society provide divergent interpretations of 
its actual scope, nature and norms. As J. Hofmann summarises, civil 
society is defined simultaneously as a specific sphere, a mode of action, 
an observable reality, a regulative idea or a utopian concept (Hofmann, 
2006). H. Anheier, L. Carlson, V. Heinrich and K. Naidoo suggest the 
following operational definition in order to enable empirical and cross-
national analysis: “Civil society is the sphere of institutions, organisations 
and individuals located between the family, the state and the market, in 
which people voluntarily associate to advance common interests” 
(Anheier, Carlson, Heinrich, Naidoo, 2001, p. 3).  Civil society, however, 
is not merely a bounded space between the state, the market and the 
citizens. As N. Chandhoke argues, civil society may become “the staging 
ground for mounting a challenge to state-given notions of what is 
politically permissible” (Chandhoke, 2003, p. 38). M. Kohn adds that civil 
society is the “terrain where citizens can organize to contest”, but also 
“defend the existing distribution of power” (Kohn, 2002, p. 297). Civil 
society represents, therefore, “a force through which citizens act” 
(Fowler, 2002, p. 6). This force may take diverse forms, such as 
professional associations, labour unions, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs), informal voluntary networks and broader political 
                                                 
2
 More specifically, the websites Enallaktikos.gr (http://www.enallaktikos.gr/), Iliosporoi 
(www.iliosporoi.net), Solidarity for all (http://www.solidarity4all.gr/), Omikron Project 
(www.omikronproject.gr )
 
and Hackademy (http://english.hackademy.gr/) 
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movements.  Civil society, thus, “embraces a diversity of …actors and 
institutional forms, varying in their degree of formality, autonomy and 
power”.   
Despite the different interpretations of the concept of civil society, there 
is a broad academic consensus on the voluntary nature of associations in 
civil society (Edwards (2004); Walzer (2003); Keane (1988); Diamond, 
Linz and Lipset (1995); Mouzelis (1995); Cohen, Arato (1992)). For 
instance, M. Walzer argues that “the words civil society name the space 
of uncoerced human association” (Walzer, 2003, p. 64). In a similar vain, 
according to L. Diamond, J. Linz and S. Lipset, organised social life in the 
realm of civil society is voluntary and self-generating (Diamond, Linz, 
Lipset, 1995). 
Following the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the 
concept of civil society became increasingly prominent in academic 
debates. During the 1990s “[e]veryone, it seemed, saw a “strong civil 
society” as one of the cornerstones of democracy… Civil society 
became…the magic ingredient that might correct generations of state 
and market ‘failure’ and resolve the tensions between social cohesion 
and capitalism” (Edwards, 2011, pp. 4-5). Within this context, civil 
society gradually became uncoupled from state institutions (Kumar, 
1993). As a consequence, a zero-sum understanding of power 
distribution between civil society and the state prevailed.  N. Uphoff and 
A. Krishna question this understanding and argue that “[d]epending on 
the aims and performance of state institutions, their strength can 
contribute to what is thought of as civil society” (Uphoff, Krishna, 2004, 
p. 358). Similarly, J. Keane suggests that the “power of civil society and 
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the capacity of state institutions can increase together, in a positive-sum 
interaction, or they may also decline together, in a negative-sum way” 
(Keane, 1988, p. 61).  
G. Ekiert and J. Kubik conclude in their analysis that “the health, 
composition, and capacity of civil society” is based on the actions and 
inaction of states (Ekiert, Kubik, 2014, p. 50). The “state and its agencies 
define the public space by making laws, by building … institutions, by 
protecting … rights and liberties, and by implementing policies that 
either empower or constrain civil society organisations” (ibid.). 
According to M. Walzer, civil society cannot dispense with the state for 
the additional reason that only the state redresses radical inequalities 
that civil society alone cannot challenge (Walzer, 2003). Since the state 
conditions associational life in civil society, a radical shift in the 
institutional capacity of the state during a period of severe economic 
crisis has an impact on the strength of civil society. 
The academic literature usually assesses the strength of civil society on 
the basis of its size, resources and density, the civil society-state 
dynamic, the level of social capital, the presence of democratic political 
values and structures, as well as the actual functions of civil society 
organizations (Salamon, Anheier (1998); Anheier, Carlson, Finn, Naidoo 
(2001); Howard (2003); Uphoff, Krishna, (2004)). While scholars have 
extensively explored the political and cultural preconditions of a strong 
civil society, they have overlooked the impact of economic change on 
associational life in civil society. Indeed, during severe economic crises, 
rising levels of social inequality and exclusion undermine citizens’ 
“inclusion into systems of social recognition and formal or informal 
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membership in the fields of civil society” (Heitzmann, Hofbauer, 
Mackerle-Bixa, Strunk, 2009, p. 284). Thus, “inequality and social 
exclusion are obstacles to the development of civil society” (ibid).  
However, although a civil society’s strength tends to decrease during an 
economic crisis, its density may actually increase. F. Moulaert and O. 
Ailenei argue that “when the economic growth engine starts to stutter, 
formal distribution mechanisms begin to fail…new social forces develop 
and give rise to alternative institutions and mechanisms of solidarity and 
redistribution as a means of addressing” the failures of official 
institutions (Moulaert, Ailenei, 2005, p. 2038).  E. Obadare illustrates this 
point by analysing how the deterioration of economic and political 
conditions in Nigeria led to the proliferation of self-help groups as well 
as the radicalisation of civil associations (E. Obadare, 2005, p. 268). 
Similarly, L. Bosi and L. Zamponi link the current proliferation of direct 
social action in Italian civil society to the economic crisis. They also claim 
that direct social action also proliferated during the political and 
economic crisis of the 70s. Hence, increased mobilisation in civil society 
may signify an emergency response to an unprecedented rise in social 
needs.  
Moreover, a dense and vibrant civil society in the context of general 
economic security is of a different nature than a dense and vibrant civil 
society responding to urgent social needs. In the first case, civil society 
initiatives reflect the free choice of citizens to engage actively in 
associational life, while in the second ‘necessity’ may be the driving force 
of numerous new schemes. Finally, the increased density of civil society 
during an economic crisis may be an ephemeral phenomenon, since 
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emergency voluntary schemes may subside when economic security 
returns to a given society.  
Academic scholars have recently shifted their attention to a more 
holistic understanding of civil society’s external environment, including 
economic conditions. For instance, L. Fioramonti and O. Kononykhina 
analyse the governance, socio-cultural and socio-economic environment 
that enables sustained and voluntary civic participation (Fioramonti, 
Kononykhina, 2015). Their analysis makes a clear distinction between 
civic participation as an act of ‘last resort’ and regular, sustained 
participation. A strong civil society, they argue, presupposes the 
freedom or opportunity to attain specific objectives. By contrast, in cases 
of acts of ‘last resort’, structural conditions or external pressure impair 
citizens’ capabilities of pursuing the most preferred course of action.  
Similarly, C. Malena and V. Heinrich acknowledge in their analysis that 
associational life in civil society is bound by existing socioeconomic 
conditions.  They underline that “although not part of civil society itself, 
the environment for action by civil society is nonetheless crucial when 
assessing its status” (Malena, Heinrich, 2007, p. 342). They propose, 
therefore, a broad set of indicators for comparing the relative strength 
of civil society over space and time, which includes the socio-economic 
context in which a given civil society exists and functions (for instance 
the presence/absence of a severe economic, social crisis). 
To summarise, even though “the quality and solidity of civil society 
depend on the amount of civic engagement” (Heitzmann, Hofbauer, 
Mackerle-Bixa, Strunk, 2009, p. 283), in order to understand whether a 
change in the density of civil society signifies a simultaneous increase in 
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its strength, one must take into account not only the enduring features 
of civil society, but also the radical disjunctions in the broader 
institutional and economic environment. The following sections explore 
the impact of the economic crisis on European civil societies and 
evaluate current trends in Greek civil society 
3. European Civil Societies and the Economic Crisis 
 
The economic crisis and the austerity policies that were implemented 
triggered the mobilisation of civil society actors. Massive anti-austerity 
protests were coupled with new forms of political participation, such as 
occupations and neighbourhood assemblies. Collective mobilisations in 
2011 and 2012 as well as the proliferation of political repertoires were 
not merely a response to the economic crisis. In a collaborative research 
project, M. Kaldor and S. Selchow find that political actors shared both 
opposition to austerity policies and extensive frustration with 
representative democracy as a practical political project (Kaldor, 
Selchow, 2013). Political actors engaged, therefore, in repertoires of 
direct action and alternative practices of ‘prefigurative politics’.3 Since 
2011, as R. Feenstra notes, “political experimentation has become a 
common trend for civil society” (Feenstra, 2015, p. 243). 
With regard to civil society’s formal organisations,4 an early global study 
by Eva-Maria Hanfstaengl documented the overall financial decline of 
civil society organisations (CSOs) during the period of 2008-2010 
                                                 
3 
‘Prefigurative politics’ refers to “a political action, practice, movement, moment or development in 
which certain political ideals are experimentally actualised in the ‘here and now’, rather than hoped 
to be realised in a distant future” (van de Sande, 2013, p. 230). 
4 
Throughout this article, the terms ‘civil society organisations’, ‘non-profit organisations’, ‘voluntary 
organisations’ and ‘nongovernmental organisations’ are used interchangeably. 
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(Hanfstaengl, 2010). CSOs faced reductions in contributions by individual 
donors, private foundations, international institutions and governments. 
Many CSOs were forced to narrow the scope of their activities, reduce 
their staff or cut salaries. The negative impact of the economic crisis on 
CSOs has not been spread evenly across regions or clusters of 
organisations. For instance, the study records that CSOs in Eastern 
Europe have been hit harder by the crisis than those in Western Europe. 
Bigger CSOs were also less affected than smaller, local organisations. 
Finally, the study reported an increase in qualified volunteer staff in 
Western Europe.5 Commenting on the voluntary sector financial crisis in 
Britain, P. Butler underlines that the impact of the crisis is more severe 
for local voluntary groups at the grassroots level (such as youth clubs, 
advice centers, refugee forums, church community projects) than for 
‘mega charities’ delivering public services.6  
Similar findings have also been recorded in a study by J. Shahin, A. 
Woodward, and G. Terzis, concerning the impact of the crisis on CSOs in 
the European Union (Shahin, Woodward, Terzis, 2013). The study 
verifies that the economic crisis has deepened the existing divide 
between large and small/locally-based organisations in the non-profit 
sector. The crisis has also reinforced the north/south divide in the non-
profit sector. In Southern Europe, CSOs face significant financial 
                                                 
5 
Robert Rosenthal, director of communications at Volunteer Match in San Francisco, attributes  
increased volunteering during economic crises to greater social awareness on community problems, 
the networking opportunities that volunteering provides for the unemployed and finally the 
replacement of donations with volunteering by people who can no longer afford to donate money. 
Khan, H. (2008), Nonprofits Challenged by Financial Crisis: A Decline in Donations and Investments 
Leads More Nonprofits to Rethink Strategies (available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/Economy/story?id=6123902&page=1-accessed on 17/09/2015). 
6
 Butler, P. (2011), Cuts: what does a voluntary sector financial crisis look like? (available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/patrick-butler-cuts-blog/2011/mar/07/what-does-a-charity-
financial-crisis-look-like -accessed on 17/09/2015).  
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constraints, since they were traditionally dependent on government 
funds. As expected, the severe cuts in government spending have 
affected them directly. Southern European CSOs have reacted to 
reduced public funding by expanding their collaborative networks 
(especially in the realm of social services) or turning to EU funds (by 
participating in projects) as a means to secure regular funding.  
CSOs’ policy input has also been affected by the crisis. Despite pressing 
social problems, the public policy focus on economic efficiency and 
budgetary cuts has marginalised CSOs’ actual policy input. Public 
deliberation has diminished, since public institutions are primarily 
interested in engaging CSOs in service provision and delivery. In 
Southern Europe, where policy-makers’ decision-making capacity has 
been severely reduced due to the austerity programmes now in force, 
CSOs’ influence on policy has decreased even further. Many southern 
European organisations argue, therefore, that they are listened to more 
on the European than on the national level.  
During the crisis, pressure by governments and donors on CSOs to 
improve their economic efficiency and financial accountability has also 
increased. The focus of donors on ‘value for money’ and measurable 
outcomes has affected the ability of CSOs to give effective voice and 
social support to the people most affected by the crisis.7 In relation to 
citizens’ engagement, the study recorded that even though most 
organisations have not experienced an increase in members, they have 
                                                 
7 
According to Rebecca Rumbul, who studied distribution of European Social Funds (ESFs) to civil 
society organisations in Wales, there is some indication “that organisations dealing with beneficiaries 
that had higher than usual support needs were more likely to be excluded from the programmes due 
to their higher unit costs, their lack of structural embeddedness and their inability to guarantee a 
certain volume of outcomes” (Rumbul, 2013, p. 358). 
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seen an increase in young, qualified volunteers. The study emphasises, 
however, that those who are hardest hit by the crisis do not actually 
engage in associational life. According to a member of the European 
Network against Racism (ENAR): “The same persons keep being active, 
but the extremely fragile ones, they just stay trying to survive…maybe 
some people get activated but if you look at real minority people who 
feel they are targets, it does not transform into getting active on these 
issues.” (Shahin, Woodward, Terzis, 2013, p. 30).  
A short overview of the impact of the economic crisis on living 
conditions in Greek society follows, in order to assess the reaction of 
civil society actors to the new socioeconomic conditions. 
4. Social Impact of the Economic Crisis in Greece 
 
The economic crisis precipitated a drastic change in the stratification of 
Greek society, intensifying social inequality, exacerbating the threat of 
poverty and creating a new class of outcasts in large urban centres. The 
cumulative shrinkage of GDP by 25% from 2008 to the end of 2013 led to 
a dramatic spike in unemployment (Bourikos, Sotiropoulos, 2014). “From 
2009 to the second quarter of 2014… about 30 per cent of the working 
population (that is, 1 million people) lost their jobs” (Petmesidou, 
Guillén, 2015, p. 20). In July 2015, unemployment reached 25.0%, 
according to monthly figures released by the Workforce Survey of the 
Greek Statistical Authority.8 During the crisis the highest rate of 
unemployment has been recorded among people aged 15-24. Youth 
unemployment rate reached an all time high of 60.5 percent in February 
                                                 
8
 To Vima (2015) ELSTAT documents a 25% rate of unemployment for July (available 
athttp://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=744255 – accessed on 09/11/2015). 
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of 2013.9 The dearth of social assistance for the unemployed is reflected 
in the small percentage of the jobless who receive regular 
unemployment benefits. In 2013 that figure was 11.7% (Matsaganis, 
2013).  
Economic crisis and fiscal austerity measures led to a dramatic 
deterioration in the living conditions of Greek households. Income data 
for 2013 released by the Greek Statistical Authority from the European 
Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) show that 
22.1% of the total population fell below the poverty line.10 An even 
higher percentage of the population (36.0%) was at risk of poverty and 
social exclusion, i.e. experiencing material deprivation or living in 
employment-deprived households. As for changes in the risk of poverty 
over time in absolute, rather than relative terms, the proportion of the 
population whose income in 2013 fell below the 2009 poverty line was 
over 45 per cent (Petmesidou, Guillén, 2015).  
The economic crisis also brought about changes in the composition of 
poverty in the population.11 In 2011 the groups at the highest risk of 
poverty were single-parent households with at least one dependent 
child, the unemployed, households with two adults and three or more 
dependent children, economically inactive persons excluding pensioners 
(housewives, etc.), households living in rented accommodation and 
                                                 
9
 Trading Economics (2015) Greece Youth Unemployment Rate 1998-2015 (available at 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/greece/youth-unemployment-rate -accessed on 15/10/2015). 
10
 Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) (2015(a)) Risk of Poverty: 2014 Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions, Press Release (available at 
http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A0802/PressReleases/A0802_SFA10_DT_A
N_00_2014_01_F_EN.pdf - accessed on 23/10/2015). 
11
 See Bank of Greece (2014), Έκθεση του Διοικητή για το έτος 2013, Athens (available at 
http://www.bankofgreece.gr/BogEkdoseis/ekthdkth2013.pdf. - accessed on 09/11/2015).  
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children of 0-17 years of age.12 Thus during the crisis poverty shifted 
from the elderly towards younger couples with children and the 
unemployed. Similar trends can be traced in income data for 2013. The 
at-risk-of poverty rate for households residing in owned dwellings was 
20.5%, while for households in rented dwellings it amounted to 28.5%.  
For employed persons the rate stood at 13.4%, while for the 
unemployed it climbed to 45.9%. Finally, the rate was lower for persons 
aged 75 years and over than for persons aged less than 75 years old 
(16.1% and 22.7%. respectively).13 However, since these poverty 
estimates are based on indicators of monetary income, they do not 
incorporate variables that are crucial to the living standards of the 
elderly, such as the quality of health care and expenditure on medicines 
(Matsaganis, Leventi, 2013). For instance, NGOs identify “retired persons 
with small pensions and healthcare problems” as one of the most 
vulnerable groups concerning access to healthcare services 
(Zafiropoulou, 2014, p. 32).14 
The rise in low-paid jobs and flexible forms of work also increased the 
percentage of the working poor who cannot secure an income above the 
poverty line. (Balourdos, 2011). In 2013 the at risk-of-poverty rate for 
persons working full-time was 11.9%, while for part-time employed 
persons it rose to 27.9%.15 The living standards of wage-earners have 
been further eroded by the informal practice of many businesses during 
                                                 
12
 See Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) (2015(b)), Material Deprivation & Living Conditions: 2014 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions, Press Release (available at 
http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A0802/PressReleases/A0802_SFA10_DT_A
N_00_2014_14_F_EN.pdf - accessed on 20/10/2015). 
13
 Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) (2015(a)), op. cit. 
14
 The other groups are: “disabled persons…persons with chronic health conditions” and “cancer 
patients.” (Zafiropoulou, 2014, p. 32) 
15
 Hellenic Statistical Authority (ELSTAT) (2015(a)), op. cit. 
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the economic crisis of not paying earned wages on time (e.g. workers 
remain unpaid for months).  
In Greece the immediate and extended family traditionally filled any 
gaps in social welfare provided by the state. During the economic crisis, 
however, there has been a significant shift of responsibility for social 
welfare away from the state and toward the institution of the family and 
private initiative. This shift leads to a greater lack of social welfare, as 
many families experience poverty and social exclusion, being unable to 
meet the needs of family members, while action taken in the realm of 
civil society inevitably takes the form of targeted assistance to the most 
vulnerable social groups.  
5. Greek Civil Society during the Economic Crisis 
 
Greek civil society in the post-dictatorial period has traditionally been 
defined as a weak civil society due to a domineering state, the control of 
political parties over the associational sphere and the presence of 
powerful clientelist networks (Mouzelis (1995); Mouzelis, Pagoulatos 
(2002); Sotiropoulos (2014); Huliaras (2015)). Moreover, public surveys 
have persistently recorded the low level of formal volunteering and 
social trust in Greek society (Clarke (2015); Fragonikolopoulos, (2014)). 
Nevertheless, academic research has documented the broad scope of 
informal volunteering as well as the gradual disentanglement of civil 
society from state institutions and political parties (Sotiropoulos (2004); 
Sotiropoulos (2014)). Those two elements have become even stronger 
since the onset of the economic crisis. Thus a common proposition 
among researchers studying formal and informal schemes in Greek civil 
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society is that a revitalisation of civil society has taken place following 
the onset of the crisis (Bourikos, Sotiropoulos (2014); Huliaras (2015); 
Boucas (2014); Loukidou (2014); Zambeta, Kolofousi (2014)). 
 
Since the crisis began, a broad spectrum of state and non-state actors 
have mobilised to provide social support to the victims of the economic 
crisis. National and local government – in cooperation with civil society 
actors and private donors, left-wing political parties, professional 
organisations and unions (e.g. of teachers, doctors and pharmacists), 
NGOs, the Church of Greece, the Catholic Church, companies and 
business corporations, mass media companies, foreign embassies, local 
groups, cooperatives and alternative collectivities - have all engaged in 
providing services and creating new structures to tackle poverty 
(Kantzara, 2014(a)). Thus municipalities co-operated with non-profit 
organisations in setting up new social welfare structures (e.g. social 
pharmacies, social grocery shops, social tuition centres, municipal 
vegetable gardens), while foundations launched funding of social 
welfare NGOs, the church expanded its welfare structures and a new 
generation of solidarity networks surfaced. Meanwhile, “there is an 
emerging trend towards increased public participation in informal 
volunteerism at neighbourhood level and in the wider local community” 
(Bourikos, 2013, p. 13). Accordingly, during the crisis, multiple actors 
with distinct, often conflicting identities and strategies have mobilised in 
Greek civil society to cover rising social needs.  
 
A study conducted by K. Loukidou on 32 civil society associations (18 
organisations with legal status and 14 informal-unofficial citizens’ 
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groups) in Thessaloniki (the second biggest city in Greece) during the 
period 2009-2013 records that 62.5% of the associations in the sample 
stated that they had been affected by the economic crisis. Specifically, 
16 of them either expanded or redirected their field of action towards 
providing social services or goods, or creating solidarity economy 
structures, while four of them were set up in response to the economic 
crisis (Loukidou, 2013). In regard to formal CSOs, K. Loukidou documents 
a sudden decrease in the annual number of new CSOs in Thessaloniki 
during the period of 2010-2012 (Loukidou, 2014). Since that decrease 
took place in the context of a proliferation of informal solidarity 
networks, a shift from formal to informal associational repertoires in civil 
society can be assumed. 
 
The following section explores current trends in the Greek NGO sector 
then presents the significant rise of informal social networks in civil 
society.  
 
5.1 The Greek NGO Sector 
 
The presence of NGOs in Greek society expanded since the 1980s 
(Fragonikolopoulos, 2014). Estimates of their actual number vary 
significantly due to the lack of an official registry.16 The Greek NGO 
sector is highly fragmented as organisations compete with each other 
for limited funds. Moreover, NGOs have had traditionally close relations 
                                                 
16
 According to D. Sotiropoulos, “the Greek Centre for the Promotion of Voluntarism claims to have 
counted 1,800 active NGOs in 25 different sectors” (Sotiropoulos, 2014, p. 12). A. Afouxenidis in his 
research records 201 active NGOs (Afouxenidis, 2015). 
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with the state and political parties so as to secure funds (Afouxenidis, 
2006).  The effects of the economic crisis on the NGO community match 
the international trends that have been recorded in the academic 
literature. Research conducted by B. Pekka-Ekonomou, C. Bibitsos, N. 
Mylonas and E. Petridou on environmental NGOs documents the 
following effects: “Fewer memberships, suspension of public grants, 
decrease in private sponsorships, increase in requests for assistance 
with/participation in social solidarity action, growing distrust in the 
broader social action environment, inability to meet operational 
expenses, expressions of ‘dissatisfaction’ by some members” (Pekka-
Ekonomou, Bibitsos, Mylonas, Petridou, 2013, p. 141). The strategies 
that the organisations adopted in order to address the new 
unfavourable circumstances were: “cutting back on operational costs, 
salaries, reducing costly public relations activities (emphasis on digital 
PR), putting emphasis on boosting volunteerism, building management 
capacity in order to participate in European programmes, adapting 
action to new social needs …” (ibid). Employment insecurity of 
permanent staff, wage cuts and organisations’ emphasis on volunteering 
has also been reported in V. Arapoglou and K. Gounis’ research of NGOs 
that provide social support to persons experiencing acute forms of 
poverty and homelessness (Arapoglou, Gounis, 2015).  
The magnitude of the financial difficulties confronting Greek NGOs is 
directly linked to the domain of each organisation. The crisis has shifted 
the attention of the public and donors towards organisations that are 
active in the field of social welfare in Greece, while support has 
diminished for organisations that deal with different issues. The rise in 
racism during the financial crisis has also had a negative effect on 
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organisations dealing with the rights and social needs of migrants and 
asylum seekers.17 Indeed, NGOs whose actions focus on or include the 
immigrant population have greater difficulty in securing private 
sponsorships and donations.18   
Public funding cutbacks have boosted the role of foundations, 
companies and business corporations in providing financial resources to 
the NGO community. Following the onset of the crisis, “a reversal of the 
percentage of participation by the public and private sectors in funding 
organisations, in favour of the private sector” has been recorded 
(Bourikos, Sotiropoulos, 2014, p. 84). Some NGOs argue that this shift 
has increased financial insecurity in the NGO sector due to the volatile 
preferences of donors and sponsors.  Moreover, they claim that donors’ 
preference for ‘short-term’ and ‘in kind’ forms of assistance does not 
correspond to the actual social needs of beneficiaries. Finally, small 
NGOs state that donors prefer large NGOs, with high public visibility 
(Arapoglou, Gounis, 2015).  
The crisis has changed the nature of social needs, directly affecting the 
range and scope of Greek NGOs’ activities. During the crisis, NGOs have 
steadily enlarged the scope of their activities beyond their traditional 
domain (e.g. school meals, health certificates for children, 
gynaecological check-ups, vaccinations) and have created mobile units to 
provide services nationwide. Most NGO action concerns the provision of 
services or goods to individuals who are already living in a state of 
                                                 
17
 The neo-Nazi party ‘Golden Dawn’ has tried to increase its political appeal by taking advantage of 
social needs during the economic crisis. It has undertaken free distribution of food to Greek citizens 
only. Beneficiaries had to show their identity card in order to receive the free food. See Kantzara 
(2014(a)); Rakopoulos (2014).   
18
 Interview with E. Thanou, op.cit.  
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poverty or social exclusion, while preventive action has become the 
exception.19 Besides providing social goods and services, NGOs also act 
as hubs in collecting and distributing goods to bodies that provide social 
welfare. The role of mediator permits organisations that do not possess 
significant financial resources to be active in the field of social welfare.20 
NGOs adopt different strategies for reintegrating individuals who have 
experienced economic and social exclusion. The larger NGOs emphasise 
the creation of parallel professional structures (such as polyclinics, youth 
support centres, guest houses, homeless day centres and food and 
goods banks). These structures are also vital tools for mapping ever-
changing social needs. Other organisations focus on the development of 
a collective identity or on regular personal contact with aid recipients. A 
typical example is that of the NGO Artos-Drasi, which aims at aid 
recipients eventually becoming agents of social solidarity through 
regular contact with the organisation’s actions. This shift, members of 
the organisation underline, is neither automatic nor inevitable. Similarly, 
the NGO Diogenes, which assists homeless and socially excluded persons 
to reintegrate into society, focuses on transforming subjective 
experiences of exclusion and isolation into feelings of belonging to a 
broader community.21 
However, few NGOs promote the formation of solidarity networks 
among beneficiaries. In their research on homelessness in Spain, A. 
Mario and J. Sanchez note that beneficiaries’ modes and degrees of 
                                                 
19
 An example of preventive action is the support services that the NGO Praksis provides to families at 
risk of becoming homeless (subsidies for rent, electricity and water bills, etc.). Interview with A. 
Tzanetos, op.cit. 
20
 Interview with L. Papageorgiou, op.cit. 
21
 See Σχεδία (available at http://www.shedia.gr/about-us/ - accessed on 21/09/2015). 
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participation influence the quality of the services provided and most 
importantly the success of their reintegration (Mario, Sanchez, 2011). 
Likewise, G. Markus, in his analysis of the activities of Detroit Action 
Commonwealth (United States), a non-profit organisation with mostly 
low-income, indigent or homeless members, emphasises the significance 
of integrating beneficiaries into the decision-making process of the 
organisation (Markus, forthcoming). As A. Fowler states, “empowerment 
… is about facilitating the ability of individuals (and groups) to make their 
own decisions” (Fowler, 2002, p. 120). For P. Oxhorn, “shared identities” 
and “the ability for self-organisation…are sources of power which can 
enable disadvantaged groups” to challenge social inequalities (Oxhorn, 
1998, p. 7). The question of the effective self-organisation of the poor 
has been vigorously debated in the academic literature, since the 
conditions constituting poverty “are deprivations of the very 
requirements of successful organisation and of long-term thinking” 
(Allen, 2009, p. 289). In the Greek context, the massive and unforeseen 
upsurge in social needs impedes long term planning by NGOs, while 
diminishing their capacity to offer adequate and effective social support. 
Thus, emergency actions usually prevail.  
During the crisis, co-operation among NGOs has been strengthened in 
order to deal more effectively with revenue constraints and the rising 
social needs. There is no record, however, of organisations consolidating 
effective long-term alliances that would lessen the fragmentation and 
asymmetries of the Greek NGO sector.22 Furthermore, fragmentation 
and competition in the Greek NGO sector has been reinforced during the 
crisis by ad-hoc project-based provision of social services and 
                                                 
22
 For weak co-operation between Greek Food NGOs during the crisis see (Vathis, Huliaras, 2013). 
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competition for similar projects (Arapoglou, Gounis, 2015). According to 
Arapoglou and Gounis, social services and support provided mainly takes 
the form of “very short-term provisions in kind to meet basic needs…of 
the poor… Project-led solutions increase uncertainty and fragmentation, 
contributing to the recycling of…. people without entitlements… who 
navigate the city neighbourhoods for food, shelter, clothing and 
medication” (Arapoglou, Gounis, 2015, p. 34). Within this context, some 
NGOs express concerns about the social and political impact of their 
actions. Apostolos Veizis, director of medical-operational support for 
Médecins Sans Frontières in Greece, admits that he is “uncomfortable 
about what the correct response should be, whether aid groups should 
even be providing such services if they let the government off the 
hook”.23 Some NGOs respond to this impasse by engaging in political 
advocacy (e.g. mobilising for a guaranteed minimum income or 
healthcare as a basic human right).24 
Since the onset of the crisis, close co-operation among NGOs and local 
authorities has been recorded.25 On the other hand, contacts between 
NGOs and the church, trade unions and social solidarity networks remain 
sketchy. NGOs are wary of some church activities, which they believe do 
not respect the dignity of the recipients.26 The trade unions aim mainly 
to develop their own social support networks. They occasionally collect 
food, clothing, or money, which they hand on to unions, NGOs and 
                                                 
23
 Phillips, L. (2011), Ordinary Greeks turning to NGOs as health system hit by austerity (available at 
http://euobserver.com/social/113841-accessed on 20/09/2015). 
24
 Interview with E. Thanou, op.cit.  
25
 According to V. Kantzara “local government…has played a significant role in organising network 
‘structures’…and bringing together varied groups, such as church with medical doctors, or NGO’s and 
local citizens’ committees” (Kantzara, 2014(b), p. 82).   
26
 Interview with E. Thanou, op.cit; Interview with A. Tzanetos, op.cit. 
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solidarity networks.27 Relations between NGOs and social solidarity 
networks range from co-operation to mutual suspicion.28 While the 
social solidarity networks point out the NGOs’ lack of assertive action, 
the NGOs point out the networks’ lack of expertise and experience.  
The NGO community encompasses organisations with diverse identities 
and priorities. Some NGOs are hybrid voluntary organisations combining 
the provision of social services with active participation in collective 
mobilisations.29 For instance, in a study by K. Loukidou of formal civil 
society organisations in Thessaloniki, 25% of the NGOs she interviewed 
participated in the Greek Indignant Movement (Loukidou, 2014). 
Although numerous NGOs engage in political advocacy, there are 
generally differences between NGOs and solidarity networks. Decision-
making in NGOs is mostly based on vertical organisational structures. 
Solidarity networks, on the other hand, tend to operate along the lines 
of direct democracy and horizontality. Collaborative frames usually 
prevail in the NGO community, while in alternative networks the overall 
frame of participation tends to be conflictual.30 Finally, most large, 
professional NGOs act as outsiders of local communities, providing social 
support to the most vulnerable social groups, while alternative networks 
usually function as insiders of a larger community of political action and 
mobilisation.  
                                                 
27
 Interview with P. Syriopoulos, op.cit. 
28
 Interview with M. Pantazidou, op.cit; CONCORD, op. cit.  
29
 D. Minkoff defines “hybrid organisations as those that combine features derived from distinct 
organisational forms—…advocacy and service provision” (Minkoff, 2002, p. 381). In his work he 
examines the emergence of new hybrid advocacy/service organisations in United States after the 
1960s. These organisations incorporated both the political tradition of service provision for social 
change by women, racial and ethnic minorities as well as of the civil rights movement and protest 
politics of the 1960s. 
30
 S. Ganesh and C. Stohl argue that collaborative frames of participation tend to prevail in forms of 
collective action that, while claiming the creation or maintenance of community or public goods, do 
not identify any particular opponents (Ganesh, Stohl, 2014).  
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5.2 Solidarity Networks - Autonomous Political/Economic Spaces 
 
Greek society has witnessed a significant rise in solidarity networks and a 
proliferation of autonomous political/economic spaces.31 These trends 
are not merely an outcome of the economic crisis. Changes in the party 
system, developments in extra-institutional politics and the growing 
appeal of a new global paradigm of radical activism have contributed to 
the strong presence of alternative networks in Greek society.32 For 
instance, social centres and neighbourhood assemblies multiplied 
following the widespread social unrest of December 2008 (Petropoulou, 
2013). Neighbourhood assemblies and social solidarity networks also 
proliferated following the end of the Greek Indignant movement in 2011 
(Triantafyllopoulou, Sayas (2012); Ishkanian, Glasius, Ali (2013); 
Rakopoulos (2014)). Moreover, the presence of numerous collaborative 
and self-managed schemes illustrates the growing influence of 
‘horizontal’ vs. ‘vertical’ political logics in Greek society.33 R. Day 
explains that contemporary radical activists seek radical change by 
dropping out, subverting, impeding existing institutions and at the same 
time prefiguring and constructing alternative communities (Day, 2005).  
In conclusion, alternative networks in Greek society are signs of a severe 
and enduring political crisis that has spilled over into the realm of civil 
society, generating alternative forms of political engagement. The 
                                                 
31
 The actual number of solidarity networks and autonomous political/economic spaces is difficult to 
trace. V. Kantzara mentions that during her research “several talked about more than 2.500 
‘initiatives’” (Kantzara, 2014(a), p. 273). 
32
 The term ‘alternative networks’ that is used in the analysis incorporates both solidarity networks 
and autonomous political/economic spaces.  
33
 ‘Horizontal’ political focus on establishing “zones of encounter, shared learning, solidarity, 
affiliation” and “...the ability to mobilise together and place pressure on the logic of the system until it 
falls.” (Feenstra, 2015, p. 245). ‘Vertical’ political logics, on the other hand, favour the production of 
vertical political structures, such as political parties.  
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economic crisis has channeled many of these initiatives into social 
support provision, while at the same time numerous new initiatives have 
surfaced as a direct response to the economic crisis. Thus, the economic 
crisis has deepened the foundations of alternative networks in Greek 
society. 
Alternative networks share the principles of solidarity, horizontalism and 
decentralisation. Moreover, alternative networks adopt political 
repertoires of direct action in order to meet social needs.34 Due to the 
multiple and diverse political orientations and actual practices of the 
schemes, no clear classification can be created. However, some 
solidarity networks address their demands to the state or were 
supported by the left-wing party Syriza while it was in opposition. Other 
initiatives prioritise political autonomy. Despite cooperation among 
activists from different solidarity networks, commoning projects, 
autonomous zones, cooperatives and collectives, political friction and 
conflict have also been recorded.35   
During the crisis, numerous alternative networks have set up solidarity 
institutions such as collective kitchens,36 solidarity pharmacies, clinics, 
groceries and voluntary shadow education (social frontistiria),37 
neighbourhood assemblies, workers’ clubs, citizen journalism outlets, 
                                                 
34
 For instance solidarity networks mobilise to reconnect power to houses that are left without 
electricity, following the introduction of a new property tax by the Ministry of Finance. According to 
the law, those who fail to pay the new tax will have their electricity cut off. Disconnections began in 
January 2012 (Triantafyllopoulou, Sayas, 2012). 
35
 Interview with K.K., op. cit. 
36
 Collective kitchens are “communal events where citizens cook and eat together”. See Omikron 
Project (available at www.omikronproject.gr - accessed on 12/10/2015). 
37
 Social frontistiria provide free tuition to students who prepare for the university entrance 
examinations. They are either organised by local authorities, NGOs, the Church and parental 
associations or political activists. In all schemes participating teachers are volunteers (Zambeta, 
Kolofousi, 2014). 
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anti-racist/anti-fascist networks, etc. (Boucas (2014); Kantzara (2014(a)); 
Rakopoulos (2014); Triantafyllopoulou, Sayas (2012); Kavoulakos, Gritzas 
(2015)). Support by alternative networks takes usually the form of 
provision of food, free medical services, drugs and vaccines, clothes, 
legal and accounting assistance, political support, alternative 
information, educational support, training programmes and workshops, 
cultural activities, promotion of open-source software, the exchange of 
seeds, etc.38 For instance, Istos, an open social solidarity space in 
Chaidari, provides legal, accountancy and medical support, and tuition 
for high school students.39 Istos’ ‘social solidarity’ group supports 
vulnerable social groups; the ‘social economy - self-sufficiency’ group 
organizes self- educating seminars and practical workshops and the ‘re-
action’ group focuses on political thinking and reflection.  
Most alternative networks operate assemblies where decisions are 
taken collectively (Boucas, 2014). In many schemes, recipients of social 
support participate in the general assembly and take active part in 
running the scheme. For example, the solidarity network of Neos 
Kosmos (Athens) is run by 35 to 40 volunteers (who contribute mostly 
financially to the network) and citizens (e.g. unemployed individuals) 
receiving social support.40 However, there are also solidarity networks 
(in particular solidarity pharmacies, clinics and groceries) where 
reciprocal relations between providers and beneficiaries have not been 
established (Kavoulakos, Gritzas, 2015). Thus, their participatory 
governance structure is mainly limited to activists who run the schemes. 
                                                 
38
 See the sites http://www.enallaktikos.gr/, www.omikronproject.gr, www.hackademy.gr/, 
www.iliosporoi.net - accessed on 12/10/2015. 
39
 See Istos (available at https://istosxaidari.wordpress.com/- accessed on 10/11/2015). 
40
See Λέσχη Αλληλεγγύης Νέου Κόσμου, (available at 
http://hackademynewz1.blogspot.gr/2013/12/blog-post_9.html#more - accessed on 12/10/2015). 
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Even though extensive empirical research has been conducted on the 
diversity and scope of alternative networks, such issues as the social 
identity of participants, the geographical dispersion of the schemes and 
their links to the surrounding communities remain underexplored. 
Many solidarity networks feel uneasy about their involvement in the 
distribution of resources or the provision of social services, since they 
used to dismiss these activities as mere ‘philanthropy’.41 They try, 
therefore, to improvise strategies that couple social support with 
political objectives. A significant challenge the solidarity networks face is 
the growing volume of requests for assistance. As a direct consequence, 
some networks are obliged to set an upper limit or certain criteria for 
social groups to whom they provide services (e.g. the poor, the 
uninsured), violating their principles of egalitarianism and solidarity.42 
Christos Giovannopoulos argues that “pressure and strain on resources 
is one of the biggest challenges the solidarity movement faces”.43 It 
affects “developing practices, ways and spaces, which foster the 
engagement and participation of all for all, setting up a different 
paradigm of social self-management, while responding to meeting the 
most immediate needs of the people”.44 Deprivation of financial, 
political or human resources also undermines efforts by schemes to 
scale up their activities.  
                                                 
41
 “Institutions of solidarity: How are we going to stop society’s impoverishment during the crisis?”, 
op. cit. In Greek society the term ‘philanthropy’ is usually associated with individual ‘charitable giving’. 
Philanthropy includes, besides individual giving, philanthropic institutions, corporate philanthropy and 
community philanthropy (Civicus, 2015). 
42
 “Institutions and networks of applied social solidarity”, op. cit. 
43
 AnalyzeGreece! (2015), Christos Giovannopoulos: Solidarity for All (S4A) - solidarity is peoples’ 
power (available at http://analysegreece.com/solidarity/item/162-christos-giovannopoulos-solidarity-
for-all-s4a-solidarity-is-peoples-power - accessed on 9/10/2015). 
44
 Ibid. 
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Political activists often adopt a dual perspective, engaging in economic 
as well as political activities. They seek to establish public spaces that are 
both politically and economically autonomous. Accordingly, during the 
crisis social and solidarity economy schemes have also multiplied. “New 
co-operatives have been set up in agriculture, media (newspaper, 
publishing house), and consumption” (Kantzara, 2014(a), p. 271).  
Exchange networks, free-exchange bazaars, free networks, parallel 
currencies (time banks, digital and virtual currencies) and alternative 
food networks have proliferated. According to K. Kavoulakos and G. 
Gritzas, 58 anti-middlemen groups, 84 Time Banks, parallel currencies 
and exchange networks or free-exchange bazaars, 23 self-managed 
urban vegetable gardens, 38 cooperatives and 140 social cooperative 
enterprises operate in the broader Attica region (Kavoulakos, Gritzas, 
2015). Various schemes (such as the Time Bank run by the Greek branch 
of the European Network of Women) predate the economic crisis, while 
others (such as the Logo-Timis and Dosse-Pare exchange networks and 
the parallel currencies Ovolos and TEM) emerged following the onset of 
the crisis (Sotiropoulou, 2011, p. 32). Some of the schemes were 
established to challenge directly neoliberal capitalism, while others were 
originally set up to address livelihood issues.45 T. Rakopoulos in his 
ethnographic study describes how anti-middleman groups in Athens 
“started by addressing immediate issues of material livelihood” and 
                                                 
45
 For an overview of the alternative networks’ relation to the market and the state see Kavoulakos, 
Gritzas (2015). Marco Aranda, questioning the practicability of refusing all forms of engagement with 
the state in contemporary neoliberal societies, illustrates how activists in the neozapatista movement 
in Germany break away from state institutions (e.g. establishing community kitchens, social centers, 
alternative distributions stores), while tactically maintaining some engagements with the state (e.g. 
accepting unemployment benefits, paying taxes on occupied buildings, using university facilities). He 
uses the term ‘infrapolitics’ to describe the fit between the means and the collective utopias in an 
adverse political environment (Aranda, 2015, p. 2-3). 
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“eventually came to address the wider solidarity economy” (Rakopoulos, 
2014, p. 321).  
Schemes in the social or solidarity economy do not belong to the realm 
of civil society, defined as a societal sphere separate from the market 
and the state. However, there is close co-operation among solidarity 
networks and collectivities in the social or solidarity economy. 
Moreover, solidarity networks develop activities in the social or 
solidarity economy, such as time banks. In both cases, “grassroots social 
welfare projects” (Rakopoulos, 2014, p. 313) are organised and the 
development of a solidarity movement in Greece is actively supported.  
A novel element of the multiple formal and informal initiatives and 
practices that have surfaced in Greek civil society during the crisis is that 
they often transcend binary divisions between formality/informality and 
legality/illegality.46 For instance, local solidarity networks, lacking legal 
status, provide social support and engage in economic transactions by 
using the legal personality of formal organisations. Acting in co-
operation with non-profit organisations and solidarity networks, doctors 
prescribe medication for uninsured individuals by adding it to 
medication prescribed for insured individuals. Municipal authorities 
tolerate occupations of public buildings and the creation of new 
autonomous political/economic spaces. During the crisis, therefore, 
clear-cut divisions between formality/informality and legality/illegality 
have become blurred as social and political actors devise new strategies 
to actualise social rights that have been suspended.   
                                                 
46
 Information about these practices has been provided by interviewees. Since this information refers 
to acts that transcend legality, the interviewees who provided this information are not identified. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The economic crisis has had a direct impact on both formal and informal 
civil society actors. With regard to civil society’s formal organisations, 
the crisis has undermined their financial viability and political influence 
while accentuating existing asymmetries in the non-profit sector. At the 
same time, European civil societies have witnessed massive anti-
austerity protests as well as the proliferation of new modes of political 
participation. In the Greek case, the economic crisis had an especially 
negative impact on formal civil society organisations. Greek NGOs have 
to struggle for their financial viability, while at the same time social 
needs multiply rapidly. Thus, Greek NGOs strive to cover more needs 
with less economic resources.  
Still, the fact that they mobilise and provide social support in the face of 
extremely adverse economic and social conditions is a sign of 
organisational resilience. During the crisis many new alternative 
networks have emerged in Greek civil society. This development is not 
merely an outcome of the economic crisis. As in other European civil 
societies, collective mobilisations and the proliferation of new informal 
initiatives are clear signs of public dissatisfaction with representative 
democracy as a practical political project. In this respect, the 
proliferation of alternative networks in Greek society reflects both the 
choice to experiment with new forms of radical activism and the need to 
provide social support in the context of the crisis. Thus, ‘need’ and 
‘choice’ guide the activities of numerous new schemes in Greek civil 
society. These two elements do not always coexist in harmony, since the 
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rising scale of social needs may circumscribe preferred political choices. 
Still, the numerous new alternative networks in Greek civil society are 
not simply remedial responses to the rising levels of poverty, but instead 
clear signs of a political radicalisation process.  
The developments that have taken place in Greek civil society during the 
crisis are bound by existing socioeconomic conditions. Indeed, the 
organisational forms and repertoires of collective action that have 
prevailed in Greek civil society during the crisis correspond to ones that 
usually emerge in periods of severe economic crises. A shift from formal 
to informal associational repertoires in Greek civil society has been 
recorded, while the density of civil society has increased. However, 
these developments do not signal the growing strength of civil society. 
During the crisis, the reduced capacity of the state to provide the basic 
rights of citizens has led to a rapid deterioration in the quality of 
citizenship. In turn, social inequality and exclusion have undermined the 
strength of civil society. As the Greek case illustrates, increased 
associationism is a necessary precondition for a strong civil society, 
although during periods of severe economic and political crises it may be 
not be sufficient. 
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